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Fall of Vicksburg," in which the author describes how Grant sought to wrest from the Confederates control of the two hundred and fifty miles of the Mississippi between Vicksburg and Port Hudson, whereby they maintained communication with their territory west of the great river.

Any narrative of these operations must furnish a remarkable testimonial to the skill, resource and extraordinary tenacity of the great captain, and to the patience and endurance of the troops he commanded ; but the story has never before been told so graphically and with such power as Mr. Fiske tells it, and its interest is greatly enhanced by the description of the part taken by the fleet.

The conditions, especially topographical, under which the war in the West was conducted, permitted and demanded strategic operations on a grand scale to a greater extent than was possible or necessary in the region wherein the armies of the Potomac and Northern Virginia confronted each other. The much smaller area in which these armies operated, and the less number of objective points whose seizure promised strategic advantages, limited their capacity in this regard, and required instead skillful, tactical maneuvering which might enable battle to be delivered at advantage. But in the valley of the Mississippi, penetrated in all directions by navigable streams connecting with each other, traversed centrally by railroad lines affording both means for offensive operations and ready communication over great distances, and full of objective points inviting attack and demanding defense because their capture or loss involved far-reaching consequences—in this vast field, opportunity was offered for the exercise of strategic ability of the highest order. Mr. Fiske has exhibited, in brief compass, but very clearly, this feature of the conflict.

BASIL W. DUKE.

Military Reminiscences of the Civil War. By General JACOB D. COX. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1900. Two vols., pp. xvii, 549 ; xvi, 596.)

Few if any volumes pertaining to the Civil War equal these in interest. They cover not only the military features of campaigns, but interwoven with these are incidents and the personal and political features attending the movements. The whole flows smoothly on in the scholarly and agreeable style of which General Cox was a master. He had wide experience in the war, having been prominent in the three months' service in West Virginia, in Pope's campaign, in the Antietam, Knoxville, Atlanta, and Nashville campaigns, and, at last, before Wilmington, and in the final operations against Johnston in North Carolina. His was, therefore, a wide field of observation, and his relations to the leading commanders were such as to give him exceptional advantages.

The chapter on the outbreak of the war vividly recalls the rush and the unanimity with which the North, without regard to party, accepted the challenge at Sumter. The details of mobilization at Camp Denni-

son are worthy of study by those writers of our war with Spain who, ignorant of the difficulties of such assembling, drove the nation crazy while our armies were gathering, by attributing conditions which, at the outset, are inseparable from all war camps, to inefficiency and neglect.

The narrative of McClellan's West Virginia campaign is the most satisfactory yet given to the public. It brings into its proper proportions the operations which removed the fighting lines from the northern states, and gave West Virginia to the Union. He justly but temperately criticizes McClellan for leaving Rosecrans to win the battle of Rich Mountain unaided, and claims that on this early theatre of action the same characteristics were noticeable which later became so well known—"The same over-estimate of the enemy, the same tendency to interpret unfavorably the sights and sounds in front, the same hesitancy to throw in his whole force when his subordinate was engaged."

Treating of the comparative merit of the volunteers and regulars General Cox expresses the opinion that, man for man, the volunteers were always better men than the average of those recruited for the regular army and more amenable to discipline. The weakness of the volunteer system was in the officers, but this was soon rectified by a gradual sifting process. He does not accept the dictum that because a young man graduated at West Point he was a good officer, and comes to the conclusion that, before the Civil War, the intellectual education at the Military Academy was essentially the same, as far as it went, as that of any polytechnic school, and that in some of the volunteer regiments were "whole companies of private soldiers who would not have shunned a competitive examination with West Point classes on the studies of the Military Academy, excepting the technical engineering of fortifications."

Reviewing Pope's campaign before Washington he deals fairly with that officer, contends that no one who had any right to judge could question his ability or his zeal, that there was neither intelligence nor consistency in the vituperation with which he was covered. He shows on good authority that the notorious order of Pope from "Headquarters in the saddle," as well as others of that period which at the time were so severely criticized and made the occasion of a bitter and lasting enmity toward Pope on the part of most of the officers and men of the Army of the Potomac, were drafted under the direction of Mr. Stanton, Secretary of War, and given to General Pope to issue, with the idea of infusing vigor into the army, by stirring words which "would by implication condemn McClellan's policy of over-caution in military matters and over-tenderness toward rebel sympathizers and their property."

General Cox was in practical command of the Ninth Corps during the Maryland campaign of September, 1862. His services at South Mountain were brilliant, and at Antietam commendable. His description of the former is full and accurate, that of Antietam is marred by many inaccuracies, especially relating to movements on the Union right. He conclusively controverts the widely and generally accepted belief that Burnside was derelict in duty at Antietam in that he did not attack

and carry the bridge, now known as Burnside Bridge, early in the day. General Cox shows that orders were not given to make the attack until nearly or quite ten o'clock, and that the movement was promptly made. He exonerates Burnside from all blame and puts the responsibility for the failure to destroy Lee's army upon McClellan, who, under malign influences at and near headquarters, had reduced Sumner and Burnside from their proper rank as wing commanders and thrown the army corps into such relation with each other that unity of action was impossible and defeat invited.

The chapter on "McClellan and Politics" is a new and deeply interesting analysis. It is natural that in treating of General Burnside's command of the Department of the Ohio, and the movement into East Tennessee, General Cox, who had prominent part therein, should attempt at much length to defend his chief for not obeying Lincoln's and Stanton's oft-repeated orders to join Rosecrans before the battle of Chickamauga. This effort will not stand the test of the record, especially when it has become known since the war that General "Sam" Jones, who succeeded by his active demonstrations in holding Burnside back, had only 1500 effective men that could easily have been taken care of with two brigades.

In the discussion of the East Tennessee campaign, with which the first volume closes, severe and unwarranted criticisms of General Rosecrans begin, leading up to a version in the second volume of his relief after Chickamauga (related to General Cox by General Garfield, and undoubtedly reported correctly), which will oblige Army of the Cumberland men to tell the full inside history of that affair, which hitherto has been known to a very small circle.

This opening chapter of the second volume is painful reading for the veterans who served under General Rosecrans. Those who know the real facts will feel compelled by this long and specific statement of General Cox to disclose them. But they can only be indicated in this brief review. Stated concisely, they are almost the exact opposite of the present narrative. Instead of General Rosecrans being unnerved and dejected when, after riding clear of the break, the general and his staff halted to consider the situation, he was clear in his orders which he requested General Garfield to give in the immediate rear, and at Chattanooga, while he himself should ride back to Thomas. Garfield persistently argued that these were matters that General Rosecrans, the supreme authority, should properly and more efficiently attend to, while he, Garfield, would ride to Thomas. To this Rosecrans yielded. Garfield's ride was by a detour of eight miles, when the direct road of only two miles was clear of the enemy. Immediately after the battle, and while still chief-of-staff, he wrote Secretary Chase a letter, which has never yet been printed, severely criticizing his chief for going to Chattanooga and otherwise unjustly attacking him. Mr. Chase took the letter to Mr. Lincoln who read it to the Cabinet. It was the direct cause of General Rosecrans's removal. These are the mildest features of the full

story. As to this ride to Thomas, of which much is made, there was no meeting of the enemy except the passing within range of a few cavalry skirmishers, and the exposure of the ride was the merest child's play compared with the fire to which every staff-officer and every soldier on the field was at that moment subjected.

The treatment of General Rosecrans throughout the volumes is generally unfriendly in the extreme, though it consists largely in the repetition of venerable criticisms which are not history. Nor is it worthy treatment of an officer who, up to the time of the break in his lines on the second day at Chickamauga, had never lost a battle, and who unquestionably was the ablest strategist of the war. The old attacks upon this officer for resisting orders to advance before full preparations, first, from Murfreesboro, and next from Winchester, are given the old prominence, without the full vindication of result, which, for the Middle Tennessee campaign, was the driving of Bragg out of the state, over the Cumberland and across the Tennessee river by strategy, with a Union loss of only 570 killed and wounded. For the Chattanooga campaign, the same tactics were repeated on a still larger scale, and Bragg was forced from his mountain stronghold without a battle. Every student of the records knows these facts now, and it is not the part of a fair historian to ignore them.

The chapters on the campaign in East Tennessee are comprehensive and interesting, and constitute in compact form a more complete history than has yet been written.

The initiation of the Atlanta campaign is preceded by an interesting presentation of the relations of General Sherman to his superiors and his subordinates, and the relations between General Johnson and Mr. Davis. General Cox's treatment of the Atlanta campaign keeps entirely out of sight the initial and most serious mistake of General Sherman in not promptly accepting General Thomas's advice to move through Snake Creek Gap, which the latter had found to be unguarded, upon Johnston's rear, and force him to battle. After a three days' delay this was found to be the only practicable move, but it was then too late to prevent the escape of Johnston which compelled the long campaign to Atlanta.

In like manner, the reader receives no impression of the needless and fruitless assault on Kennessaw Mountain, so costly in the loss of life. It is rather treated as a bold stroke called for by the existing conditions.

In spite of the fact that General Grant's map received by General Sherman on April 4, a month before the Atlanta campaign opened, has now been found, and has long been public in the *Atlas* of the War Record Series, which map clearly laid down a March to the Sea after the fall of Atlanta, General Cox, as in his former writings, continues to attribute the origin of this march to General Sherman. As is now well known, General Sherman's plan, which he finally induced General Grant to acquiesce in, differed from that of the latter in leaving Hood in his rear for Thomas to take care of, with an army yet to be assembled, and marching to Savannah with no enemy in his front.

While General Cox's details of Hood's movements against Thomas, culminating in the annihilation of the Confederate army, are full, and presented in most readable form, there is little to indicate the herculean task laid upon Thomas of gathering an army and resisting Hood, who, from May to September had stubbornly retarded Sherman's combined force. This account contains various criticisms upon Thomas's dispositions, and suggestions that this or that movement would have been better. But the destruction of an army is a better criterion by which to judge General Thomas in this campaign than the speculations even of General Cox.

The campaign of General Schofield's army, in which General Cox commanded the Twenty-third Corps, is deeply interesting and a valuable contribution to history. Especially is this true of the closing chapters on the Sherman-Johnston Convention, the surrender, and the disbandment of Johnston's army. Here, however, as in other important matters mentioned, the fact of great consequence to full discussion is not given proper prominence, namely that the first Sherman-Johnston terms, in nearly all their essentials, were written by Mr. Reagan, the Confederate Postmaster-General. This original paper is now in the War Department.

While the work will inevitably excite controversy, each of its fifty-one chapters will be found interesting, and none of them should be overlooked by any student of our war history.

H. V. BOYNTON.

The *Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1899* is published in two volumes. The second, consisting of the fourth annual report of the Historical Manuscripts Commission, and embracing the Correspondence of John C. Calhoun, will be reviewed in our next number. Vol. I. (Government Printing Office, pp. xii, 871), begins with the usual narrative account of the last annual meeting, (that of Boston and Cambridge, December, 1899), and with the inaugural address of President Rhodes. Of the sixteen papers which follow, seven, like Mr. Rhodes's address, were read at the meeting, and were summarized in that article of the REVIEW for April 1900 in which that meeting was dealt with. These are Professor E. G. Bourne's paper on the Proposed Absorption of Mexico in 1847-1848, that of Dr. W. G. Andrews on a Recent Service of Church History to the Church, Miss Putnam's on Robert Fruin, Professor Robinson's on Sacred and Profane History, that of Professor C. M. Andrews on the question whether recent European history should have a place in the college curriculum, and that of Professor Henry E. Bourne on the Colonial Problem. Nine other papers, read by title only at the meeting, are now printed. Dr. Carl Russell Fish, now of the University of Wisconsin, presents a series of tabular views showing the removals of officials by the President of the United States; Mr. F. H. Miller a careful compilation of the facts respecting legal qualifications for office in America. There is a good investigation of the *droit de banalité* during the French régime in Canada,